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PRESERVING PRIVATE COLLEGES'
INDEPENDENCE FROM TITLE IX
REGULATION: GROVE CITY
COLLEGE v. BELL
Equal opportunity for men and women' has been a prominent goal
of recent federal legislation.2 Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 19723 extends this goal by proscribing sex discrimination in educa-
tion programs and activities4 receiving5 federal financial assistance.
1. Ruth Bader Ginsberg has written a series of articles outlining the constitutional
evolution of the equality principle. See Sex Equality Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 161 (1979); Sex Equality
and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REv. 451 (1978); Some Thoughts on Benign Class#Fca-
tion in the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813 (1978); Gender and the Constitution,
44 CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975).
2. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1982); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); Equal Educational Oppor-
tunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1982).
3. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (June 23,
1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982)).
4. Title IX authorized the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
to issue regulations to implement and enforce the statute. Section 902 of Title IX
provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan,
or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and
directed to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect to
such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general appli-
cability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the stat-
ute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is
taken.
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982). The regulations promulgated by HEW pursuant to Title IX
provide for education programs and activities as follows:
(a) General. Except as provided elsewhere in this part, no person shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any . . . education program or activity oper-
ated by a recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance.
34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a) (1984).
5. One of the ongoing debates in Title IX analysis concerns the scope of the term
"recipient." HEW regulations define recipient as follows:
(h) "Recipient" means any State or political subdivision thereof, or any instru-
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Both legislators6 and educators7 have attempted to limit this regula-
tion in order to preserve the independence and diversity of private
institutions.8 Title IX's enforcement agency, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), 9 initially adopted an expan-
sive interpretation of Title IX's regulatory powers'" by applying the
statute to entire institutions instead of assuming a programmatic fo-
cus. The Supreme Court rejected HEW's approach in Grove City
mentality of a State or political subdivision thereof, any public or private agency,
institution, or organization, or other entity, or any person, to whom Federal fi-
nancial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and which
operates an education program or activity which receives or benefits from such
assistance, including any subunit, successor, assignee, or transferee thereof.
34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1984). See infra note 17 and accompanying text for an argu-
ment that an institution cannot be classified as a recipient if it does not accept federal
aid.
Most courts have followed the definition of "recipient" developed in Bob Jones
Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'dmem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir.
1975). The district court described a "recipient" as the intermediary entity whose
nondiscriminatory participation in a federally assisted program is essential to the pro-
vision of benefits to the identified class which the statute is designed to serve. Id. at
601 n.15. Some commentators argue, however, that "recipient" should be defined
narrowly to protect the beneficiaries of federal aid from unnecessary fund cutoffs.
See, e.g., Note Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University: Defining 'Recioient" and
"Program or Part Thereof,"78 MICH. L. REv. 608 (1980).
6. See infra note 25 for a discussion of the legislative history. One commentator
argues that in enacting Title IX, Congress approved a general principle rather than
for specific implementation features. It was not until the application of Title IX that
Congress fully understood the possible implications of the statute. Since then, persis-
tent efforts have been made to define and limit the scope of the provision, but these
efforts have been thwarted largely because of the strength of the women's coalition.
See A. FISHELL & J. PoTrKER, NATIONAL POLITICS AND SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
EDUCATION 95-136 (1977).
7. For a discussion of private institutions' response to HEW interpretations of
Title IX, see infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
8. For an essay on the importance of private institutions and the effect of federal
regulation upon them, see Note, Title IX Sex Discrimination Regulations: Impact on
Private Education, 65 Ky. L.J. 656 (1977). The author, addressing the fears of private
institutions, observes that "[t]hese private institutions, many of which receive no di-
rect financial aid, fear that the independence and diversity of thought which they
foster will be lost if they are forced to comply with federal regulations." Id at 663.
See also 117 CONG. REc. 39,248-39,249 (1971) (Senator Erleborn's comments on the
importance of protecting private institutions from government control).
9. Congress transferrred HEW's functions under Title IX to the Department of
Education in 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 601, 93 Stat. 969 (Oct. 17, 1979). Throughout
this Comment, both agencies will be referred to as "HEW."
10. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (HEW's Title IX
interpretations).
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College v. Bell,II holding that Title IX's directive applies not to an
entire institution, but only to the programs and activities receiving
federal financial assistance.'
2
Grove City College is a private, coeducational college that has con-
sistently refused to accept any federal or state financial assistance.'
3
Grove City College, however, enrolls a substantial number of stu-
dents who receive Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs).14
Student eligibility for BEOGs is determined by the Alternate Dis-
bursement System,'" which requires no direct involvement by the
College. Based upon the receipt of BEOG's by Grove City students,
HEW concluded that the institution was a recipient of federal finan-
cial assistance within the meaning of Title IX, and requested that
Grove City execute an "Assurance of Compliance with Title IX Reg-
11. 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 44-63.
13. 104 S. Ct. at 1214. Grove City even refused to participate in student assist-
ance programs in which the College would be responsible for determining student
eligibility for federal aid. Many state and federal student assistance programs require
that a student's educational institution calculate the student's financial need and make
a determination as to the student's eligibility to receive assistance from that program.
See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. pt. 675 (1984) (College Work-Study Program); 34 C.F.R. pt. 674
(1984) (National Direct Student Loans); 34 C.F.R. pt. 676 (1984) (Supplemental Edu-
cational Opportunity Grants).
Grove City and Hillsdale College v. United States Dep't of H.E.W., 696 F.2d 418
(6th Cir. 1982), both involved colleges with unblemished records of sexual equality.
Had HEW instead pursued, in principal cases, colleges with blatant discriminatory
practices, this controversy may not have arisen.
14. Some Grove City students also receive Guaranteed Student Loans (GSLs).
The district court, however, held that GSLs were "contract[s] of insurance or guar-
anty" that cannot be terminated under Section 902 of Title IX. 500 F. Supp. at 273.
HEW did not challenge this conclusion on appeal; thus, the Supreme Court did not
consider it. 104 S. Ct. at 1216 n.9.
15. 104 S. Ct. at 1215 n.5.
The Secretary, in his discretion, has established two procedures for computing
and disbursing BEOGs. Under the Regular Disbursement System (RDS), the
Secretary estimates the amount that an institution will need for grants and ad-
vances that sum to the institution, which itself selects eligible students, calculates
awards, and distributes the grants by either crediting students' accounts or issu-
ing checks. 34 C.F.R. Section 690.71-85 (1982). Most institutions whose students
receive BEOGs participate in the RDS, but the ADS is an option made available
by the Secretary to schools that wish to minimize their involvement in the admin-
istration of the BEOG program. Institutions participating in the program
through the ADS must make appropriate certifications to the Secretary, but the
Secretary calculates awards and makes disbursements directly to eligible stu-
dents. 34 C.F.R Section 690.91-96 (1982).
19841
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ulations."' 6 When Grove City refused to file the Assurance, HEW
initiated proceedings to declare the College and its students ineligible
to receive BEOGs. HEW based its action on Grove City's refusal to
file the Assurance of Compliance; HEW made no allegations of ac-
tual sex discrimination. The College responded that, absent receipt
of federal or state aid and absent participation in BEOGs distribu-
tion, the institution could not be classified as a "recipient" within the
meaning of Title IX.'7 The College also argued that because Title IX
is program-specific, 8 only the school's financial aid department
could be brought under Title IX.'9 Finally, the College argued that
Title IX's remedial provision only applies to programs actually dis-
criminating on the basis of sex.2 0
The administrative law judge held that Grove City College was a
recipient of federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title
IX and executed an order terminating assistance to the College until
it complied with HEW regulations.2 ' Grove City College and four
students filed suit in federal court. The district court found that stu-
dents' receipt of BEOGs constituted federal financial assistance to the
College, but held that federal assistance could not be terminated
without an actual finding of discrimination. 2 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when federal aid to an insti-
tution is indirect, the institution is the program. 3 The circuit court
16. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 provides:
(a) General. Every application for Federal financial assistance for any educa-
tion program or activity shall, as a condition of its approval, contain or be ac-
companied by an assurance from the applicant or recipient, satisfactory to the
Assistant Secretary, that each education program or activity operated by the ap-
plicant or recipient and to which this part applies will be operated in compliance
with this part.
Id
17. Grove City argued that since it was not a recipient of federal assistance, it was
not required to comply with Title IX regulations. HEW's definition of recipient, how-
ever, covered almost all institutions, including institutions that have traditionally re-
fused all aid. See supra note 5.
18. "Program-specific" is the term of art used to distinguish a programmatic ap-
proach from an institutional approach. According to the language of the statute, Title
IX pertains only to those "program[s] or activit[ies] receiving financial assistance." 42
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
19. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 1982).
20. Id
21. See 104 S. Ct. at 1216.
22. Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
23. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
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also concluded that a showing of actual discrimination was not neces-
sary to terminate a recipient program's funds.24
Title IX was designed to avoid the use of federal resources to sup-
port discriminatory practices at institutions of higher education.25 In
drafting Title IX, Congress instituted a program-specific mandate
which provides that no person may "be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance."26 The ultimate sanction for noncompliance is the termi-
nation of aid to the discriminating program.27
HEW has interpreted Title IX broadly,28 facially conforming to the
program-specific language by treating the institution itself as the rele-
24. Id at 700.
25. Title IX was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982), which prohibits racial discrimination in federally
funded programs. Title IX's pinpoint termination provision was a duplication of Ti-
tle VI's termination provision, except for the substitution of the word "sex" for "race,
color, or national origin." In fact, the drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it
would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the preceding eight
years. 117 CoNG. REc. 30,408 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Birch Bayh). The Supreme
Court subsequently ruled that Congress intended Title IX to be interpreted in the
same way that Title VI had been interpreted. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979).
26. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (June 23,
1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982)).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982) delineates Title IX's enforcement procedure. It pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be ef-
fected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under
such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express
finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with
such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particu-
lar political entity, or part hereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding
has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program or part
thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other
means authorized by law...
Id
28. HEW Secretary Weinberger defined HEW's interpretation of the scope of Ti-
tle IX, stating:
[P]rograms that have any educational value or any educational meaning are the
ones that are covered regardless of whether the Federal funds go specifically to
those programs. In other words, if the Federal funds go to an institution which
has educational programs, then the institution is covered throughout its activities.
Hearings on Sex Discrimination Regulations Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary
Education o/the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 466, 485
(1975), reprinted in Kuhn, Title IX., Employment and Athletics Are Outside HEW's
Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49, 63-64 (1976) (emphasis added).
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vant program.29 This regulatory approach has been a subject of con-
troversy since its inception.30 In opposition to HEW's interpretation,
private institutions argue that Title IX's provisions apply only to
those programs and activities that directly receive federal financial
assistance.3' The critical issue between this dichotomy of viewpoints
concerns the scope of the term "program. 32
Congress used Title VI as its model when drafting Title IX,33 sub-
stituting the prohibition of discrimination based on race with a prohi-
bition of discrimination based on sex. The pertinent provision of
Title VI was interpreted in Board of Public Instruction of Taylor
County v. Finch.34 Finch involved an appeal of HEW's decision to
terminate all federal aid to a school district because of the district's
inadequate progress toward desegregation. The Finch decision fo-
cused upon the "program or activity" phrase contained in Title VI.35
29. For HEW's institution-as-the-program analysis, see the discussion in Grove
City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 1982).
30. A sampling of the cases dealing with HEW's interpretation of Title IX in-
cludes: Seattle Univ. v. United States Dep't of HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980)
vacated sub nom. United States Dep't of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 456 U.S. 986 (1982);
Rice v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); Romeo Community Schools v. United States Dep't of
H.E.W., 438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), af'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Isleboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
31. Some institutions have argued that Title IX only applies to programs directly
receiving financial aid. See, e.g., Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376
(E.D. Mich. 1981), aI'd, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983).
The issue in this case is most pertinent to private educational institutions. Public
institutions, because of the amount of federal aid they receive, are less likely to object
to Title IX regulation. When public institutions are involved, the issue concerns the
application of Title IX, and not whether or not the institution is subject to the statute.
32. A critical problem in Title IX analysis has been to balance the remedial goals
of Title IX against the statute's restrictive language. Some argue that a narrow inter-
pretation of Title IX serves only to frustrate its remedial goals. Others argue that a
broad interpretation compromises the restrictive language that Congress built into the
statute. See Note, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments. Harmonizing Its Re-
strictive Language With Its Broad Remedial Purpose, 51 FORDiAM L. REV. 1043
(1983) (Title IX should not be watered down by technical exercises in statutory con-
struction; rather, Title IX's remedial goals require that the statute be given an expan-
sive reading).
33. See supra note 25.
34. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
35. In Hillsdale College v. United States Dep't of HEW, 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir.
1982), the court noted the similarity between the "program or activity" phrase con-
tained in Title VI and Title IX:
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held Title VI to be program-spe-
cific and ruled that each program deserves consideration on its own
merits." The Finch holding provided the early analytical framework
for considering Title LX cases.
Several theories have emanated from the circuits regarding the
scope of HEW's regulatory authority under Title IX. One such the-
ory was adopted in Haffer v. Temple University,37 when the Third
Circuit affirmed the lower court's adoption of the "benefit theory."38
The "benefit theory" postulates that federal assistance received by
one program benefits all other programs within an institution by free-
ing funds that would otherwise be allocated to the federally assisted
program. As long as at least one university program receives federal
funding, the indirectly-benefited nonrecipient programs become sub-
ject to Title IX regulation.
Haffer involved an action filed by female students enrolled at Tem-
ple University charging that the University discriminated against wo-
men in the operation of its intercollegiate athletic program. The
court found the athletic program subject to HEW regulation 39 even
though none of the federal aid received by Temple was earmarked
for that program." The court accepted HEW's argument that the in-
tercollegiate athletic program "benefited" from the federal assistance
extended to other university programs.
Another theory which expands Title IX coverage beyond federally
Sections 602 and 603 of Title VI are absolutely identical to sections 902 and 903
of Title IX; section 601 is almost identical except that it prohibits discrimination
based on "race, color or national origin" whereas section 901 prohibits discrimi-
nation based on sex, and section 901 is limited to "any education program or
activity" whereas section 601 covers "any program or activity."
Id at 421 n.9 (emphasis added).
36. 414 F.2d at 1078. The court noted that "[u]nder this procedure each program
receives its own 'day in court.'" Id
37. 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), ajtd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
38. For a general discussion of the "benefit theory," see Kuhn, supra note 28, at
71.
39. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1981). For an inter-
esting discussion of the Haffer decision and its implications for intercollegiate athlet-
ics, see Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Adducing Congressional Intent, 24
B.C.L. REv. 1243 (1983).
40. Temple University received over $19 million in federal financial aid. That
amount constituted over 10% of its budget. 524 F. Supp. at 540.
19841
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funded programs is the "infection theory."'4  This theory maintains
that if discriminatory practices in one program infect the entire insti-
tution with a discriminatory environment, the entire institution
should be subject to Title IX regulation. The best example of such a
practice is a discriminatory admissions policy, such as the one found
in Bob Jones University v. Johnson.4z In Bob Jones, a Title VI case,
the University excluded unmarried nonwhites from consideration for
admissions. Although the University received no direct federal aid,
some of its students received funds from the Veterans Administration
(VA). The court upheld HEW's termination of VA benefits, classify-
ing the entire institution as the relevant program.43
In light of these varying interpretations of the program or activity
clause, the Supreme Court recently considered the spectrum of Title
IX theories in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell.' The Court
considered the issue of whether Title IX's prohibition included sex
discrimination in educational employment.4 5 In finding that Con-
gress intended Title IX to include employment, the Court highlighted
the program specific mandate of Title IX,46 overruling the Second
Circuit's finding that HEW's regulatory powers were broader than
their termination powers.a7 Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court,48 argued that it makes little sense to interpret Title IX so that
HEW's authority to promulgate rules is broader than its authority to
41. For a general discussion of the "infection theory," see Kuhn, supra note 28, at
68-70. See also Note, supra note 5.
42. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), afdmem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
43. Another example of the infection theory is found in Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y
v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1983). In Iron Arrow, an all-male honorary-recog-
nition society brought action seeking to enjoin the Secretary of HEW from terminat-
ing federal funding to the University of Miami for giving "substantial assistance" to
the society. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit found that Iron
Arrow's existence as the most prestigious society at the University had a pervasive
discriminatory effect upon all of the University's academic programs, whether feder-
ally funded or not. The discriminatory practices of the society infected the entire
academic mission of the University. Id at 564-65.
44. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
45. The issue of whether Title IX's prohibition includes sex discrimination in edu-
cational employment has been a subject of great controversy. The Third Circuit ad-
dressed this issue in Grove City in its Title IX analysis. 687 F.2d 684, 702 (3d Cir.
1982).
46. 456 U.S. at 536.
47. Id at 514.
48. North Haven was a 6-3 decision. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
joined Justice Powell's dissent.
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enforce those rules. 49
The rule in North Haven, that Title IX regulation must be applied
in a program-specific manner, began a new period in Title IX inter-
pretation. Until the Supreme Court's decision, courts had a free
hand in choosing which interpretative theory to follow." The North
Haven decision severely limited the application of other theories to
Title IX regulation. HEW must apply Title IX on a program-specific
basis and can no longer rely on the infection or benefit theory to
mask its institutional approach. Justice Blackmun, however, specifi-
cally noted the Court's failure to define what constitutes a "pro-
gram."'" The decisions since North Haven, therefore, have focused
upon defining the scope of the "program or activity" clause.
Two conflicting explanations for the definition of "any program"
developed in the post-North Haven period. 2 In Grove City, the Third
Circuit adopted HEW's institution-as-the-program analysis. 3 The
court was obviously constrained by the North Haven holding,54 but
49. 456 U.S. at 537. Justice Blackmun wrote that "it makes little sense to interpret
the statute. . . to authorize an agency to promulgate rules that it cannot enforce." Id
at 537. Justice Blackmun was responding to an argument that HEW's power to pro-
mulgate rules was extremely broad, although its power to enforce those rules was
limited to the specific program receiving federal financial assistance. Justice Black-
mun noted that both Title IX's funding termination provision and the portion of Sec-
tion 902 authorizing the issuance of implementing regulations contain language
suggesting a program-specific approach. Id at 536-37.
50. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
51. 456 U.S. at 540.
52. Although most courts continued to express their opinions as to the definition
of a recipient and whether or not Title IX is program-specific, the only issue that was
still subject to controversy was the definition of a "program." The North Haven deci-
sion narrowed the controversy over Title IX interpretation by disposing of several
corollary issues. Justice Blackmun was, however, keenly aware of the boundaries of
his opinion. Justice Blackmun specifically wrote that "we do not undertake to define
.program' in this opinion." 456 U.S. at 540. The interpretation of a "program" was
left for Justice White in Grove City.
53. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
54. Citing the North Haven decision, the Third Circuit held:
We concede, as we must, that Title IX's provisions, on their face, are program-
specific. See North Haven, 456 U.S. at 540. We cannot agree, however, that
Congress intended to limit the purpose and operation of Title IX by a narrow
and illogical interpretation of its program-specific provisions. Rather, we believe
that Congress intended that full scope be given to the non-discriminatory pur-
pose that Title IX was enacted to achieve, and that the program-specific terms of
Title IX must therefore be construed realistically and flexibly.
Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted).
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reasoned that a program should not be defined so as to render Title
IX ineffective when the federal financial assistance is non-earmarked
or indirect.55 The court held Grove City College subject to Title IX
regulation, ruling that when aid to an institution is indirect, the insti-
tution itself must be the program. 6
In Hilsdale College v. Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare,5" the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the Grove City decision.58
Analyzing Title IX's statutory language and legislative history,59 the
Hillsdale court limited Title IX regulation to an institution's specific
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 60 Even
though the facts in Hillsdale are virtually identical to those in Grove
City,6 the court found that only the financial aid program of the Col-
lege could properly be regulated under Title IX. The Hillsdale court
reasoned that to hold an entire institution subject to Title IX regula-
tion would render the program-specific mandate of North Haven nu-
gatory.62 Therefore, the court rejected the Grove City decision,
finding it inconsistent with the program-specific language of Title
IX° 6 3
55. 687 F.2d at 698.
56. Id at 700.
57. 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982).
58. Id at 429-30.
59. Title IX originated as a floor amendment by Senator Bayh in 1971. In its
original form, Title IX embodied an institutional approach; this was considered irrel-
evant to the bill under consideration. Senator Bayh's original version read:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subject to discrimination under
any program or activity conducted by a public institution of higher education, or
any school or department of graduate education, which is a recipient of Federal
financial assistance for any education program or activity ...
117 CONG. REC. 30,156 (1971).
The provision ultimately enacted replaced the institutional language with the pro-
gram-specific language presently contained in §§ 901 and 902. See North Haven Bd.
of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523-30 (1982) (summary of Title IX's legislative
history).
60. 696 F.2d at 424-27.
61. Grove City and Hillsdale College differ only because Hillsdale College partici-
pated in the direct disbursement system while Grove City College chose to have BE-
OGs distributed indirectly through the Alternate Disbursement System. As the
Supreme Court noted, however, this difference is immaterial for the application of
Title IX. 104 S. Ct. at 1218.
62. Hillsdale College, 696 F.2d at 430.
63. Id. at 429-30.
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Faced with this split of interpretations in the circuits, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to hear Grove City College v. Bell.64 The
Court began its analysis by finding Grove City College to be a recipi-
ent of federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title IX.65
Because BEOG's were one of the primary components of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972, the Court stated that Congress could not
have intended to exclude them from the nondiscrimination require-
ments adopted in the same bill.66 Furthermore, the Court reasoned
that any attempt to distinguish between direct and indirect aid would
favor form over substance, a policy which has been rejected consist-
ently by the rules of statutory construction. 67
In construing Title IX's program or activity clause, the Court held
that the program-specific language restricts regulation to an educa-
tional institution's individual program receiving federal financial
assistance.68 Justice White, writing for the Court, began by noting
that, had the College been involved directly in the distribution of BE-
OGs through the Regular Disbursement System (RDS), there would
be no doubt that only the student financial aid program would be
subject to Title IX regulation.69 It would be unfair to impose institu-
tion-wide coverage simply because the College chose to have BEOGs
distributed indirectly through the Alternate Disbursement System
(ADS).7°
Justice White rejected the benefit analysis adopted by the court of
appeals. First, there was no evidence that BEOGs divert funds to
other programs.7' Second, Justice White stated that a benefit analy-
sis is inconsistent with Title IX's program-specific mandate. Under
the benefit theory, an entire institution could be subjected to Title IX
regulation because one student obtained a government grant.72 Con-
64. 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983).
65. 104 S. Ct. at 1216-20.
66. Id at 1217.
67. Id at 1218.
68. Id at 1220-22. Part III of the Court's opinion, holding that Title IX regula-
tion is limited to the specific program within an educational institution, is the most
controversial section. Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor,
joined in all but Part III. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined Justice
White in Part III of his decision.
69. Id
70. See supra note 61.
71. 104 S. Ct. at 1222.
72. Id
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gress did not intend to follow financial aid dollars from classroom to
classroom.
The Court, however, affirmed the lower court's ruling that Grove
City was required to file an Assurance of Compliance.73 Because the
Assurance pertains only to those programs regulated under Title IX,
its filing does not contravene Title IX's program-specific mandate.
Grove City College must file an Assurance evidencing compliance
with Title IX's nondiscrimination requirements in the operation of its
student financial aid program.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the
Court's program-specific holding in Part III of its opinion.74 The
dissent asserted that the majority ignored congressional intent75 and
reached a conclusion unsupported by Title IX's legislative history.76
Justice Stevens suggested three factors compelling a different result:
1) the Court should give a broad interpretation to remedial civil
rights statutes; 77 2) given the similarities between Title IX and Title
VI regulations, the Court could assume that Congress anticipated the
broad interpretation that HEW gave Title IX;78 and, 3) Title IX's
post-enactment history reveals several occasions when Congress not
only approved HEW regulations but also refused to pass proposals to
invalidate far-reaching regulations.79 Justice Brennan concluded that
the program-specific language of Title IX was intended only to en-
73. Id at 1222-23.
74. 104 S. Ct. at 1226-37 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens also dissented from Part III of the Court's opinion, arguing that it
was advisory, as well as based on an inadequate record. Justice Stevens relied on
recent changes to Title IX interpretation made by HEW. HEW now limits Title IX
regulation to the specific educational program or activity being assisted by federal aid.
See Brief for the Respondents, at 15-16, Grove City College v. Bell. In Grove City,
HEW conceded that the relevant program is the College's financial aid program.
Based upon this reinterpretation, Justice Stevens argues that the definition of a pro-
gram was no longer in dispute because the two parties were in agreement. Realisti-
cally, however, the Court's opinion would be meaningless without Part III because
the definition of a program is the primary issue in Title IX analysis.
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, concurred in
Part III of the Court's opinion, but went on to call HEW's actions in the case "an
unedifying example of overzealousness on the part of the Federal Government." 104
S. Ct. at 1223 (Powell, J., concurring).
75. 104 S. Ct. at 1226 (Brennan, J., concurning in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id at 1227-28.
77. Id at 1227.
78. Id at 1228-29.
79. Id at 1235.
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PROGRAM-SPECIFIC TITLE IX REGULATION
sure that the coverage of the statute be dependent upon the scope of
the assistance provided. According to Justice Brennan, if federal fi-
nancial assistance is intended to aid an entire institution, then the
institution as a whole should be subject to the nondiscrimination re-
quirements of Title IX.8°
Based upon the statutory language, the legislative history and the
relevant case law, the Court correctly decided the Grove City case. A
contrary finding would have been based upon either a limited selec-
tion of the available interpretative material or an inappropriate exer-
cise of judicial policy-making. Justice White's opinion lays to rest the
final issue of Title IX interpretation: the statute's program-specific
language restricts regulation to an institution's individual program
receiving federal financial assistance.
The most significant effect of the Grove City decision is to allow
private institutions to continue admitting students who receive fed-
eral assistance without sacrificing the diversity and autonomy which
represent the backbone of their excellence. The continuation of
broader interpretations of Title IX would have presented private in-
stitutions with the decision of either closing their doors to those in
need of federal assistance or compromising their tradition of aca-
demic autonomy and diversity of student populations.
An analysis of the history of Title IX reveals two fundamental
flaws in HEW's interpretation of its regulatory authority. First,
HEW became the victim of its own authority. Instead of enforcing
the prohibition on sex discrimination in higher education, the pri-
mary purpose of Title IX, HEW attempted to test and expand the
boundaries of its authority in situations never envisioned by the stat-
80. Id at 1237.
[T]he program-specific language in Title IX was designed to ensure that the
reach of the statute is dependent upon the scope of federal financial assistance
provided to an institution. When that financial assistance is clearly intended to
serve as federal aid for the entire institution, the institution as a whole should be
covered by the statute's prohibition on sex discrimination.
Id.
Justice Brennan's argument contains two basic faults. First, Justice Brennan
has conducted what can only be described as a selective analysis of the available
interpretative material. By using a selective approach, he has been able to struc-
ture an argument which is not representative of Title IX's history. Second, Jus-
tice Brennan argues that if assistance is intended to benefit an entire institution,
the entire school should be subject to Title IX regulation. Justice Brennan ne-
glects the issue concerning student assistance programs. The federal dollars are
intended to give students the opportunity to attend the college of their choice.
The program is not intended for the benefit of the school itself.
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ute's drafters. The two principal cases that HEW chose to pursue
involved schools with unblemished records of sexual equality. Thus,
even if HEW had been successful, its victories in these cases would
not have affected sex discrimination in higher education.
In addition, there is a fundamental error in tying nondiscrimina-
tion requirements to student assistance programs. History has proven
that private institutions will continue to reject students receiving such
conditional aid to remain free of government regulation. The tying
of government regulation to student assistance dollars has the effect
of creating additional discrimination by depriving those students who
cannot afford to finance their educations independently of the oppor-
tunity and choice of receiving a private education. Thus, any legisla-
tive response to the Grove City decision should not focus on
restructuring Title IX, but should concentrate on finding alternate
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